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Peter Hupe 
Dimensions of Discretion: 
Specifying the Object of Street-Level Bureaucracy 
Research 
Abstract 
At the street level of the state public policies get their final form and substance. This being so, discretion is a 
key concept. The goal of this article is to specify discretion as a research object in the study of street-level bu-
reaucracy. Therefore the theoretical views on discretion prevalent in juridical and other disciplines are ex-
plored. Discretion appears to be a multi-faceted concept. This finding has consequences for the analysis of dis-
cretion in the explanation of what happens in street-level bureaucracies.  
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1. Introduction 
‘When we have doubts about a file, we talk amongst ourselves. Before we go and see a manager, we 
ask each other: What would you do?’  
 
Dubois (2010, p. 150) quotes this respondent to illustrate how an employee of a French 
welfare office uses his or her discretion when settling a difficult case.1 For a number of 
reasons the statement of this person working in public service is interesting. First, it indi-
cates the possibility of individual variation: not all employees of the welfare office con-
cerned may consult their colleagues in a similar way. Second, organizational variation 
may be expected. The same task may be differently fulfilled, due to the varying charac-
teristics of the agencies involved. Even welfare offices implementing the same kind of 
social security laws can be structured in different ways, while management and organiza-
tional culture may vary as well. Third, there may be variation at the scale of systems as a 
whole. The ways in which similar tasks, in this case, the provision of welfare benefits, are 
institutionally embedded, may vary along cross-national lines. While welfare benefits 
seem an inherent feature of welfare states, in France the provision of such benefits will be 
shaped differently from the way they are in Germany or the United Kingdom – although 
all members of the European Union. 
Hence the research issue of generalization is on the table. There are reasons to expect 
that the practiced peer review observable in the quote above, describes a ‘universal’ phe-
nomenon as induced by street-level discretion which can be assumed to be inherent in 
policy implementation as such. However, the assumption tells us little about the frequen-
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cy of peer review and the nature of its results. This goes even more for the degree to 
which those who have formulated and decided upon the public policy involved, have left 
freedom of judgement to those who are deemed to implement it. 
Opening the ‘black box’ of what happens on the ground floor of the state Lipsky (1980) 
coined the term street-level bureaucracy. He found that, rather than in the political-
administrative centre, ‘public policy (..) in important ways (..) is actually made in the 
crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers’ (Lipsky 1980, p. xii). With the 
latter term he refers to individuals who work in ‘public services’ like ‘schools, police and 
welfare departments, lower courts, legal services offices’ and who ‘interact with and have 
wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or the allocation of public sanctions’ (ibid., 
p. xi). An important element Lipsky deems inherent to the work of street-level bureaucrats is 
the presence of discretion. ‘Policy makers and economists might wish it were otherwise, but 
it seems clear that in the implementation of social welfare programs there remains an irre-
ducible extent to which worker discretion cannot be eradicated’ (ibid., p. 28). In the 30th an-
niversary expanded edition of his book Lipsky (2010, p. xix) adds that he wants to ‘identify 
the common elements of occupations as apparently disparate as, say, police officer and so-
cial worker’. This ‘essentially comparative approach’ enables us ‘to raise questions system-
atically about apparent differences in various service areas’ (ibid.). Since Lipsky’s book was 
published a range of empirical studies on street-level bureaucracy have been carried out; for 
overviews of the state of the field, see Maynard-Moody/Portillo 2010; Smith 2011; Brodkin 
2012; Meyers/Lehmann Nielsen 2012. In most of those studies discretion, one way or an-
other, is a key concept. It often figures as a more or less broadly defined label under which 
aspects of bureaucratic practice at the street level get attention.  
When the study of street-level bureaucracy is conceived as comparative research, and 
therefore the issue of generalization is at stake, there is a need to differentiate between what 
needs explanation and what may be seen as potentially explanatory factors, using explicit ce-
teris paribus clauses. First and foremost the programmatic aim of comparison implies the 
specification of the object of street-level bureaucracy research. Authors have attempted re-
views of the literature on discretion (see, for example, chapters 12 and 13 in Hill 2013). Sel-
dom, however, has comparing and contrasting the varying approaches to the concept been the 
explicit, singular, objective. Therefore specifying discretion as such is the goal in this article.  
Given this objective it seems useful to take a closer look at the ways the concept of 
discretion is viewed in law and other academic disciplines. After all, scholars in those dis-
ciplines may use different vocabularies, but in fact they, too, are interested in the empiri-
cal phenomena which the concept refers to. An exploration of such theoretical views may 
provide insights useful for street-level bureaucracy research. Hence the central question in 
this article is: When the study of street-level bureaucracy is conceived as comparative re-
search, how is ‘discretion’ theoretically viewed in the various disciplinary literatures, and 
what consequences can be drawn from these views for the treatment of discretion in 
street-level bureaucracy research?  
First an exploration will follow of the ways in which the concept of discretion is 
viewed in the theoretical literatures on law and in other disciplines. Subsequently a view 
on discretion as research object is constructed, based on approaches from those disci-
plines. Then, in the fourth section, empirical street-level bureaucracy research is ad-
dressed. The ways discretion has been conceptualized get attention, and leads on to sug-
gestions for the analysis of discretion in comparative street-level bureaucracy research. 
The article ends with a conclusion. 
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2. Theoretical views on discretion  
2.1 A juridical view on discretion 
The uses of discretion, edited by Hawkins (1992a, p. v), takes as its point of departure the 
view that discretion – ‘an elusive concept’ – has been given attention by lawyers and so-
cial scientists, in relative isolation from each other. Hawkins (1992b, p. 13) points out that 
he has brought perspectives from law and social science together, aware that he is using 
the latter term ‘in a general way to embrace often very disparate work by sociologists, po-
litical scientists, economists, organizational theorists and others’. It seems relevant to 
identify substantively the ‘disparate’ character of that work. Here this will be done by 
characterizing separately juridical, economic, sociological, and political views on discre-
tion.  
Hawkins (1992a, p. v) states that those who work in jurisprudence and administrative 
law have addressed discretion while being concerned with ‘decision-making procedures 
and the scope for the play of individual judgment afforded within a structure of rules’; (..) 
also with the nature of discretionary power, with the ways in which official authority is 
used, and with questions of legitimacy’. While ‘law is fundamentally an interpretive en-
terprise’, discretion, as the translation of rule into action, is inevitable (Hawkins 1992b, p. 
11). There are three points here: 
 
‒ ‘(T)he use of rules involves discretion, while the use of discretion involves rules’ 
(ibid., p. 12).  
‒ ‘Discretion is heavily implicated in the use of rules: interpretative behaviour is in-
volved in making sense of rules, and in making choices about the relevance and use of 
rules’ (ibid., p. 13).  
‒ ‘Discretion – which might be regarded as the space, as it were, between legal rules in 
which legal actors may exercise choice – may be formally granted, or it may be as-
sumed’ (ibid., p. 11).  
 
Legal philosophers are concerned with the extent to which rules authorize discretionary 
behaviour. As related to a set of rules discretion occurs ‘when someone is in general 
charged with making decisions, subject to standards set by a particular authority’ 
(Dworkin 1977, p. 31, quoted by Hawkins 1992b, p. 13). Hawkins observes distinctions 
made in the legal-philosophical literature like the ones between weak and strong discre-
tion (Dworkin 1977), formal and informal discretion (Goodin 1986), and between discre-
tion as subjective justice and rules as formal justice (Handler 1986). Legal scholars tend 
to think about discretion ‘as if it were not only a property of individual behaviour, but al-
so essentially rule-guided, as if legal decisions were the product of individual knowledge, 
reflection and reasoning‘ (Hawkins 1992b, p. 18). 
2.2 An economic view on discretion 
Economists share a world view in which the homo economicus is central. Unlike the study 
of law with its focus on formal rules, discretion as such is not a term used in economics. 
However, in what is called the principal/agent approach a similar phenomenon is being 
analyzed. The term principal refers to the rational actor who seeks the maximisation of his 
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(her) interests, aiming at benefits as high and costs as low as optimal. He (she) has prefer-
ences and makes decisions, being led by the wish to arrive at a ‘rational choice’.   
This approach has been adopted and adapted in policy analysis by researchers from out-
side economics (see, for instance, McCubbins et al. 1984, 1987; Bendor et al. 2001; Water-
man/Meier 1998; for an application to supervision and compliance, see Brehm/Gates 1994). 
Being aware that other actors may be useful to realize his preferences, the principal seeks an 
agent. The choice of the agent must be functional to the realization of the interests of the 
principal. The problem of trust is addressed in terms of adverse selection. When the agent 
works in the name of the principal, their relationship is characterized by information a-
symmetry. Because the behaviour of the agent cannot be completely supervised, the princi-
pal makes a claim to the loyalty of the agent. However, even when monitoring procedures 
have been designed, control of the agent by the principal remains a risk (moral hazard). 
It is in this context that ‘compliance’, respectively, ‘deviance’ or ‘divergence’ become 
issues. The actions of the agent are supposed to be functional to realizing the preferences 
of the principal. Although their relationship is a hierarchical one, there are limits to direct 
control. Apart from the indicated information a-symmetry the agent is a rational actor as 
well, acting in a calculating way. Therefore the principal will invest in institutionalizing 
and using a range of ex ante and ex post controls. For the ‘agency preference’ of the prin-
cipal it is important to suppose that agents will do more ‘their best’ with decisions close to 
their own preferences; ‘bureaucratic preferences’ are a phenomenon to reckon with 
(Gains/John 2010).  
2.3 A sociological view on discretion 
Within sociology discretion gets attention – although under varying headings – in organi-
zational sociology. Authors like Gouldner (1954), Blau (1955), Simon (1957) and Merton 
(1957) have encountered the context-setting rather than predetermining role of adminis-
trative and organizational rules. They all have, by implication, acknowledged the limits to 
direct control of organizational behaviour. 
Authors like Freidson (1970) make a case of contrasting ‘profession’ and ‘bureaucra-
cy’ as, respectively, having, freedom (autonomy) and being constrained (discretion). Others 
have criticised such contrast as being rhetorical rather than empirical, certainly in health 
care (see Exworthy/Halford, eds 1999; Dickinson/Mannion, eds 2012).  
Furthermore, the study of street-level bureaucracy itself bears a substantial sociologi-
cal imprint. Exploring administrative discretion from his early work on, Hill (1969, 1972), 
for example, has been approaching processes of social interaction in an empirically open 
way. Also in the successive editions of his textbook on public policy he has kept a pro-
filed, sociological, focus on how discretion ‘works’ (Hill 2013). Prottas (1979, p. 298) 
observes: ‘A general rule in the analysis of power is that an actor with low ‘compliance 
observability’ is relatively autonomous. If it is difficult or costly to determine how an actor 
behaves and the actor knows this, then he is under less compulsion to comply’. Weatherly 
(1980, p. 9) states that teachers, and street-level bureaucrats in general, ‘are certainly re-
sponsive to public policy. But their activities are also responsive to a number of other in-
fluences over which the policy maker and administrator may only have limited or no con-
trol’ He speaks, rather of a ‘pyramid-shaped organization’ of an ‘irregularly shaped 
sphere with vectors of different size directed inward’.  
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While Lipsky (1980) already spoke of ‘alienation’ and ‘coping behaviour’ of street-
level bureaucrats, these typically sociological, respectively, psychological concepts since 
then have got more attention (see, for instance, Tummers 2012). The study of representa-
tive bureaucracy has focused on the street level as well, more or less directly addressing 
the question how demographic traits of contact officials influence ways of rule application 
(see, for example, Christensen et al. 2012). 
2.4 A political view on discretion 
While some of the leading exponents of the sociological perspective will consider them-
selves in disciplinary terms as political scientists, we may identify a separate ‘political’ 
view. The ‘primacy of politics’ expresses the normative view underlying the poli-
tics/administration dichotomy (Wilson 1887; Goodnow 1900). What has been legitimately 
decided upon in the institutions of state and democracy, should be implemented accord-
ingly. In fact this view is articulated in the stages heuristic of the policy process (Ander-
son 1984). 
Next to this meaning of politics as a locus, however, ‘the political’ can also be used as 
a focus: a particular way of looking at the world. The sources for such a political view are 
various. Among the oldest ones are Aristotle’s Ethics (2004) and Plato’s The Republic 
(1955). In his Ethics Aristotle gives attention to the activities men are supposed to per-
form for the common good, active in the polis. Distinguishing between the Market and the 
Polis as models of society Stone (2002) mentions equity, efficiency, security, and liberty 
as ‘Goals’. In fact, the latter term refers to what is being addressed as public values.  
The articulation and maintenance of those public values concern a profession, not to 
say a vocation (Weber 1947). As one of the first political scientists, Machiavelli (2011) 
formulated the mechanisms of power, exercised by a public actor. Edelman (a.o. 1988) 
added a macro-perspective to these insights, analyzing political language and symbols as 
used in the ‘political spectacle’. Given the logic of politics, public talk and public action 
do not coincide (for an exemplary case study, see Hood/Dixon 2012). The competence of 
combining the substantive and the strategic sides of politics, and weighing public values 
in an accountable way, can be considered to be a craft (cf. Sennett 2008). Political-
administrative craftsmanship is not reserved for actors in a specific locus of the public 
domain. Practiced however far from the rule-making institutions, ‘discretionary’ action of 
public actors, even if not labelled as such, requires an adequate use of ‘governance skills’ 
(Hupe 2011).  
3. Discretion as a research object 
The goal in this article is to specify discretion as a research object. In the previous section 
the juridical view on discretion has been explored, while Hawkins’ general label ‘social 
science’ has been differentiated in, respectively, an economic, sociological and political 
view on discretion. Next, analytical constructions of these views can be made, by distin-
guishing some parameters, in order to enhance comparison. That is done in this section by 
looking at the defining characteristic of each of the theoretical views, the sources of dis-
cretion, and the type of role the discretionary actor is supposed to fulfil; see Table 1. 
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In the juridical view discretion involves delegated authority. The foundation for dis-
cretion is situated in legal rules. These rules may have been formulated in laws in a literal 
sense but in fact this applies to all formal rules laid down in public policies. On a legiti-
mate basis margins are circumscribed within which a degree of freedom for rule applica-
tion is granted. In the economic view interest representation is central. The principal 
makes a rational choice about how his (her) interests can be realized. The freedom grant-
ed to an agent to contribute to this interest representation is checked by controls. In the 
sociological view no formal limits are posed to the freedom of judgement. The individual 
capacity to assess situations in the interaction with clients is trusted upon, and seen as, to 
a certain extent, result of professional training and experience. Institutional power strug-
gles may be the result. In the political view on discretion the reference point is the pursuit 
of public values in the name of the common good. The exercise of power is functional to 
this aim.  
 
Table 1. Theoretical views on discretion 
 Juridical view Economic view Sociological view Political view 
Defining 
characteristic 
Delegated authority Interest 
representation 
Freedom of 
judgement 
Public values via 
public power 
Sources Formal rules Interests Judgement capacity Public legitimacy 
 
As far as defining characteristics are concerned authority, interests, judgement, and values 
and power indicate varying dimensions of discretion. Next to the juridical view, in which 
rules are central, there stand three ‘social scientific’ views (cf. Hawkins). At the same time 
the juridical and the economic views on discretion jointly feature a hierarchical relationship. 
The latter has a closed, one-to-one, character. For the discretionary actor only the rules of 
the rule maker, respectively, the interests of the principal, are supposed to count. Among the 
four theoretical views, the discretionary actor in the sociological view is approached as hav-
ing the largest freedom, in the sense that direct external control by one ‘principal rule mak-
er’ is limited. With the ‘primacy of politics’, when politics is approached as a locus, the look 
at discretion bears resemblances with the hierarchical one from the juridical and economic 
perspectives. However, in a view on ‘the political’ as a focus, ‘discretion’ takes the form of 
the ways public actors perform their tasks in the public domain, with an orientation to serv-
ing the general interest. Under the rule of law, in a democracy, they are expected to act on 
the basis but also within the limits of legitimately granted powers.  
Hence, in the four theoretical views on discretion the role of the discretionary actor 
varies from rule follower and agent to professional and public actor acting in a situation 
of relative autonomy; see Table 2.  
 
Table 2. The role of the discretionary actor 
 Juridical view Economic view Sociological view Political view 
Discretionary role Rule follower Agent Professional Public actor 
Nature of role script Prescriptive input Prescribed  
output 
Occupational 
standards 
Desired  
outcome 
Role fulfilment     
‒ Idealtypical ‘By the book’ ‘Taking initiative’  ‘Autonomous’ ‘Legitimate’ 
‒ Adverse variant ‘One-sided’ ‘Limit seeking’ ‘Hard to manage’ ‘Opportunistic’ 
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While the nature of the roles varies, so do the scripts for each role and, accordingly, appro-
priate role fulfilment. In the juridical view discretion is meant to bring about the accom-
plishment prescribed in the rules concerned. ‘Going by the book’ enhances the chance of 
such accomplishment. It may imply, however, that others than the rule maker assess the dis-
played action by the discretionary actor as one-sided. In the economic view discretion is 
needed to have subordinate others realize specified interests. Contracting tasks to an agent 
involves a loss of control for the principal. For the agent the issue is to minimize that control 
loss. Taking the initiative may be functional to realizing the principal’s interests as pre-
scribed outputs – if within limits. In the sociological view what is central, irrespective of the 
degree of formally granted authority, is adequate judgement of the situation at hand. The 
discretionary actor fulfils the role in a substantial autonomy, which makes him or her diffi-
cult to manage. In the political view discretion is instrumental to realizing societally desired 
outcomes, in a direction legitimately decided upon. While this requires the exercise of pow-
er in a relative autonomy, there is a chance of opportunism. 
With discretion as prescriptive input the juridical view is the most predetermining, 
while the sociological view on discretion – not prescribing specified action – is the most 
open. As suggested above already, this also means that the usage of terms like ‘compli-
ance’, ‘rule bending’, ‘deviation’ or ‘divergence’ is specific. These qualifications are con-
nected with the juridical and economic views on discretion, as having in common a hier-
archical view on the discretionary actor.  
4. Discretion in street-level bureaucracy research 
Although acknowledged as ‘disparate’, Hawkins (1992b) addressed the alternative to the 
juridical view on discretion under the encompassing heading of ‘social science’. In the 
previous two sections this general label has been differentiated, while a range of theoreti-
cal views on discretion have been explored. Now we address the ways discretion is con-
ceptualized in empirical studies on street-level bureaucracy, including its connections 
with other concepts, like rules and autonomy. In particular we will look at the conse-
quences to be drawn from the cross-disciplinary exploration. At the basis of this section 
are books and articles from international academic journals on street-level bureaucracy, 
front-line work, and linguistically equivalent terms.  
4.1 Definitions and sorts of discretion  
Distinguishing between ‘policy as written’ and ‘policy as performed’ (p. xvii) Lipsky 
(2010, p. xii) speaks of a ‘paradoxical reality’. On one hand the work of street-level bu-
reaucrats is ‘highly scripted’; on the other it requires ‘improvisation and responsiveness to 
the individual’ (ibid.). The term ‘street-level bureaucracy’ itself embodies this paradox: 
‘How to treat all citizens alike in their claims on government, and how at the same time to 
be responsive to the individual case when appropriate’ (ibid.). Lipsky acknowledges that 
discretion will vary according to the nature of the street-level tasks at hand. The greater 
the degree of discretion, the more salient is such an analysis in understanding the charac-
ter of worker’s behaviour. Although hence characterised as a ‘relative concept’, discretion 
is ‘difficult, if not impossible’ to reduce (ibid., p. 15).  
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In the empirical studies on street-level bureaucracy following Lipsky’s classic Davis’ 
(1969, p. 4) definition is often quoted: ‘A public officer has discretion wherever the effec-
tive limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action 
and inaction’. Stensöta (2012, p. 554-5) defines discretion as ‘the latitude that front-line 
bureaucrats possess to interpret rules when implementing programs, making them de facto 
bureaucratic policy makers’. While Soss et al. (2011, p. i225) speak of ‘the discretion 
possessed by case managers’, Brodkin (2011, p. i272) states: ‘(D)iscretion involves more 
than either a simple response-to-incentives or a response-to-preference. Discretionary 
choices also derive from specific organizational conditions that interact with performance 
incentives (and preferences) to create a street-level calculus of choice’.  
Dubois (2010) focuses on roles and identities of welfare workers as created and influ-
enced by institutions. Three main points guide Dubois’ (ibid., pp. 3-6) analysis: first, the 
identity and social roles that play a part in the interactions at the desk; second, managing 
tensions and producing consent; maintaining the institutional order, and third, the uses 
and practices of the institution, its functions and their joint transformations. ‘Neither im-
personal bureaucrats nor standardized clients exist: only social agents with individual per-
sonalities who, within certain conditions and limits, are required to play the role of the 
impersonal or standardised bureaucrat or client’ (ibid., p. 3). The relationship of an indi-
vidual street-level bureaucrat with the institution is ambivalent; it is characterized by 
‘both a “social bond” and coercion’ (ibid., p. 16).  
This has implications for the usage of discretion. Referring to Dupuy and Thoenig 
1985) Dubois (ibid., p. 150) states that street-level bureaucrats ‘make arrangements’. 
‘(T)hey cannot only stick to merely implementing the regulations’ but ‘use their discre-
tion and apply the rule according to their interests (Bourdieu 2005)’ (ibid.). In the contacts 
with individual clients this may mean ‘favours and favouritism’, with a chance that they 
‘bring about discredit and conflict’ (ibid., p. 153). Although, however, mistakes can be 
used as pretexts for complaints, they ‘are usually easily accepted at the desk. Injustice 
rarely leads to scandals’ (ibid., p. 153-4). 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, p. 10) refer to Frederickson ‘who reminds us that 
discretion is inherent in all acts of administration’. Rules and supervision do play a role, but 
as a ‘feature of the social terrain that the worker must navigate’ (ibid., p. 18). Speaking of 
‘state-agents’ and ‘citizen agents’ Maynard-Moody and Musheno distinguish two ‘narratives 
of street-level work’. While street-level workers embody both, their stories appear to be ‘cit-
izen centered more than rule centered, and the workers’ judgments are more moral than le-
gal’ (ibid.). ‘Rather than relying on policy to guide so-called discretionary decisions about 
cases, workers first make judgements about the citizen-client and then turn to policy to help 
enact or, if negative, to rationalize their judgements’ (ibid.).     
In several studies on street-level bureaucracy sorts of discretion are specified. Qualify-
ing labels are, for instance, administrative discretion (Sowa/Coleman Selden 2003), bureau-
cratic discretion (Scott 1997; Keiser/Soss 1998); and front-line discretion (Ellis 2011). The 
latter author refers to a distinction made by Taylor and Kelly (2006): value discretion, rule 
discretion and task discretion. Blackmore (2001, p. 147) speaks of informal discretion. ‘Dis-
cretionary powers’ is used by Riccucci (2005) and Walker/Niner (2005). Furthermore, the 
distinction between objective discretion – related to law to be applied (styles of rule applica-
tion) and subjective discretion – related to managing one’s workload (coping strategies) can 
be found (Winter 2003, p. 8). Riccucci and Meyers (2004, p. 592) describe their measure of 
workers’ discretion as constructed by ‘summing answers to a series of questions about 
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whether their decisions are controlled largely by agency rules (low discretion) or by the ex-
ercise of professional judgement (high discretion)’.   
Evans (2010) writes about ‘professional discretion’ as exercised by, particularly, pro-
fessional social workers in management roles. While considering discretion ‘a difficult 
idea to pin down’ he he argues that one should avoid definitional debates about a concept 
like this (ibid., p. 2). He quotes Smith (1981), who looks at ‘(…) the language of discre-
tion in relation to the action of discretion’, and adds ‘As a topic, discretion is concerned 
with the extent of freedom a worker can exercise in a specific context and the factors that 
give rise to this freedom in that context’. De jure discretion is about ‘the authority to act, 
the official recognition of a right or entitlement to decide, such as professional discretion’. 
De facto discretion refers to ‘having the power to act, though not necessarily officially 
recognised’. It can be associated with ‘a capacity to act because of the absence of effec-
tive control’ (ibid., p. 33). 
Three ‘regimes of discretion within managerialised social services’ are distinguished 
by Evans, each with a different characterisation of discretion (Table 3.1., p. 66). Next to 
the regimes labelled ‘dominant managerialism’ (discretion undesirable and severely con-
strained) and ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (discretion widespread, necessary but also prob-
lematic), Evans puts forward ‘discursive managerialism’. In the latter perspective, ‘practi-
tioner discretion is contingent upon local circumstances and draws on a range of resources 
and alliances specific to locations. It shares the street-level bureaucracy perspective’s 
view of the possibility of de facto discretion, but also points to the possibility of profes-
sional discourse as a resource in creating discretionary space’ (Evans 2010, p. 153). Evans 
(ibid., p. 151) refers to Evetts (2002) who has argued that ‘the idea of discretion as auton-
omy – that is absolute freedom – is a myth: discretion is freedom within constraints’.  
Comparing welfare administration in the USA, Germany and Sweden Jewell (2007) 
observes ‘three worlds of social welfare’. He tries to link ‘macro-’ and ‘micro-’ analysis 
by connecting ‘national culture, institutional history, and agency organization to ground-
level practice’ (ibid., p. 34). Micro-level differences may, in a ‘nested’ way, be related to 
system differences, resulting in varying regulatory environments. Addressing ‘welfare 
caseworker behaviour’ and ‘activation caseworker behaviour’ as dependent variables 
Jewell places them in context. Across different institutional settings discretion may vary 
not only as it is used (micro) but as it is granted (macro) as well. 
4.2 The discretionary actor and autonomy 
While Lipsky focuses on the individual street-level bureaucrat as the discretionary actor, 
sometimes the discretion of the individual public functionary as either manager or opera-
tor is addressed (Kelly 1994). Evans (2011, 2012) looks at the discretion of professionals 
as managers. Doing the latter is not taken for granted. Weissert (1994, p. 245) observes 
differing perceptions of discretion: ‘(S)ome office directors and assistants had difficulty 
in applying the term to caseworkers. (…) Worker discretion has been overemphasized and 
manager discretion undervalued in previous work’. Ringquist (1995), observing discretion 
as ‘making judgements regarding policy action not prescribed in detail by formal rules or 
legislation’, points out the fact that ‘discretion can also be exercised by mid-level civil 
servants (determining acceptable civil penalties, determining research designs), upper-
level civil servants (setting agricultural-loan interest rates, approving operating licenses), 
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and political appointees (accepting final administrative rules, setting the discount rate)’ 
(ibid., p. 339).  
Scott (1997, p. 37) makes links between discretion on the scale of the organization 
and of the individual. Bureaucratic discretion is viewed as ‘a range of choice within a set 
of parameters that circumscribes the behaviour of the individual service provider. These 
parameters can exist in the form of organizational rules, or they can be externally sourced, 
being grounded in laws or even norms or codes associated with professional practice’. 
Some empirical studies focus on discretion, but not as exercised by individuals at the mi-
cro-level. Spence (1999), for instance, looks at agency discretion, Keiser (1999) at state 
bureaucratic discretion. 
The link made between discretion and rules is ubiquitous. Oberfield (2010) makes a 
distinction between ‘rule followers’ and ‘discretion users’. Speaking of ‘rule-bound and 
discretionary behaviour in bureaucracies’ Walker and Niner (2005, p. 64) support Brad-
shaw’s view (1981) implying that ‘there is a rules/discretion continuum rather than any 
sharp distinction between discretion-based and rule-based organizations. The same organ-
ization, section and even individual officer seem able to operate satisfactorily at different 
points on the continuum according to the nature of the task being undertaken’. 
Several authors make a connection with autonomy. Jorg et al. (2005, p. 826), for in-
stance, state: ‘Autonomy is defined as the freedom to make discretionary decisions’ (see 
also Ballou 1998 and Batey/Lewis 1982). Sosin (2010, p. 381) observes: ‘Autonomy to-
ward clients frequently is referred to as organizational discretion: the ability of organiza-
tional members to act independently from the demands of authorities’. Often the concept 
of autonomy is used in relation to an occupation. Bundt (2000, p. 775) looks at the auton-
omy of librarians as professionals while Smith/Meier (1994, p. 556) find that: ‘Far from 
restricting the autonomy of teachers, bureaucrats can free them from administrative re-
sponsibilities and allow them to concentrate on what they do best – teach (...)’.  
Often the concept of autonomy is used in relation to the level of an organization, like 
Verschuere (2007) does. In a study of the bureaucratic autonomy of some American ex-
ecutive agencies Carpenter (2001) makes a sharp distinction, relevant here. For him dis-
cretion is part of a contractual arrangement, given to an agency in a statute, as leeway to 
interpret and enforce a law within certain bounds. Bureaucratic autonomy, on the other 
hand, ‘is external to a contract and cannot be captured in a principal-agent relationship’ 
(ibid., p. 17). ‘(T)he key prerequisite for autonomy is bureaucratic reputation’ (ibid.). Hu-
ber and Shipan (2002) approach discretion and autonomy as related concepts. Their book 
is about ‘the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy’ (subtitle), while they 
treat the ‘level of discretion in statutes’ as the dependent variable (ibid., p. 218). 
4.3 Discretion in context 
Dependent or independent variable. The general usage of the term in street-level bureau-
cracy research makes it look as if ‘discretion’ has a uniform meaning. In fact, it has not. 
Some studies in which a distinction between sorts of discretion is made, indicate that the 
term refers to two different empirical phenomena. In one meaning, discretion stands for 
the degree of freedom as prescriptively granted by a rule maker to an actor supposed to 
apply the rules from the latter. This ‘granting’ can happen more or less deliberately. It is 
sometimes expressed as ‘the preferences of politicians’ (Huber /Shipan 2002, p. 24), but 
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does not always have to be a matter of ‘rational choice’. In an alternative meaning the 
same term discretion refers to the ways granted freedom is actually being used. The focus 
is on behaviour, in a given setting. Mostly it is the behaviour of individual actors at the 
street-level that is looked at. 
All street-level bureaucracy researchers share a focus on discretion-as-used. They al-
so acknowledge, to a larger or smaller degree, the influence of the discretion granted in a 
specific policy statute, as a relative one. Hence the usage of the same term for both phe-
nomena hides in fact a rather fundamental difference in meaning. On the one hand the 
term discretion refers to a determinant of output and thus regards an independent variable, 
on the other to empirical variation in behaviour which needs to be explained. Then discre-
tion is a dependent variable.  
Now it becomes possible to formulate some definitions. When the term rules is re-
served for action prescriptions from a formal rule maker, discretion can be seen as granted 
freedom to act within limits prescribed in a given set of rules. Discretionary authority is 
the freedom to act within prescribed limits, as granted by a legitimate rule maker. As such 
this authority may be exercised by a variety of actors, on a range of layers; it is not a pre-
rogative of the individual public servant at the street-level. In contrast to discretion as de-
scribed in rules, the way freedom is used refers to actual behaviour of actors. If the latter 
is the empirical object, it seems sensible to use a corresponding conceptualization. Also 
autonomy is a characteristic of an actor. More precisely, autonomy concerns the freedom 
of actors to pursue their own sustained course of action as accepted by relevant others on 
the basis of a reputation for expertise and appropriate task fulfilment (cf. elements adopt-
ed from Carpenter 2001). 
A multi-dimensional theoretical approach. Discretion is a broad term, which has mul-
tiple meanings. In street-level bureaucracy research the term discretion, unless specified, 
seems to function as a general label for what needs explanation. With that character it is 
in the company of similar umbrella concepts authors have come up with in their quest to 
capture the unspecified ‘rest’: practice beyond expressed intentions. As such the concept 
looks interchangeable with other grand terms employed in research to designate what 
happens in the ‘later’ parts of policy processes. In those parts, ‘after a bill has become a 
law’ (Bardach 1977), so much takes place, that researchers have tried out a range of um-
brella labels for addressing varying aspects in this process as their empirical object. Ex-
amples are administration in the politics/administration dichotomy, implementation in the 
stages picture of the policy process, but also performance, a concept prevalent in the con-
temporary study of public management (cf. Walker et al. 2010). These different terms 
have in common that they are used as a general label for what in fact entails a variety of 
activities (forms of action), practiced by different actors, at a range of action spots. 
However the degree of specification of the term discretion, in most empirical studies 
on street-level bureaucracy the primary focus actually appears to be on observed or self-
reported rather than presupposed behaviour. Probably both as a cause and consequence of 
that fact, the imprint of the sociological view on the scholarly theme as a whole, is clear. 
It has led to a diversification of insights on what happens in the practice of bureaucracies 
at the street-level. At the same time, a full understanding (Verstehen) of ‘what happens’ 
there, as well as an explanation of empirical variation, cannot do without the aspects cen-
tral in the theoretical views of the other three disciplines.  
The sociological view points at processes of social interaction within and at the bor-
ders of organizations. The economic view draws attention to issues about control over 
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agents in contexts of divergent interests and the transaction costs involved. The political 
view focuses on questions about legitimacy. And the juridical view clearly points out the 
interplay between rules and discretion. All these aspects are important. Also in a ‘bottom-
up’ analysis of social interaction the possible occurrence of interest-driven behaviour (cf. 
the homo economicus) cannot be overlooked. The working of power mechanisms and the 
prevalence of particular values in the public sphere indicate the relevance of the political 
view (cf. Brodkin’s 1990 ‘policy politics’). And in the end, even in a ‘horizontal’ (cf. ‘cit-
izen-agent’) view the fact has to be acknowledged that street-level activities of public 
servants involve delegated authority ‘vertically’ exercised in the name of the state. 
When explaining what happens at the street level of that state is the objective, all four 
discipline-bound questions and subsequently highlighted issues are relevant. The problem of 
‘too many variables’ (Goggin 1986), the fact that we do not know much yet about the rela-
tive weight of factor clusters, as well as practical constraints for doing research, leave the 
ideal of a more comprehensive analysis aside. It is a greater explanatory potential that is 
aimed at when making a case for a multi-dimensional theoretical approach of discretion. 
Contextualization. The ways in which discretion as granted differs can be expected to 
have a substantial impact on the variation in the ways discretion is used. As Jewell (2007, p. 
188) observes, behaviour of street-level bureaucrats will vary, due ‘to differences in a varie-
ty of institutional influences that impact their work’. Taking the characteristics of legal and 
public-administrative systems and other institutional factors, like administrative culture, into 
account can shed a differentiated light on the role of discretion. Even if the consultation of 
peers, indicated in the quote in the Introduction, can be expected to be a more or less univer-
sal phenomenon, its frequency will vary across settings. In France, where the quote comes 
from, discretion to specify broad regulatory rules, is a more common feature than, for in-
stance, in Germany. Here, by contrast, usually more detailed specifications are made in the 
laws themselves. The use of discretion is then structured via prescriptions in particular ad-
ministrative procedures. For research this implies the need to specify the rules involved, as 
well as their sources. Also the nature of control by and the conceptions of the rule makers 
behind the law or policy-on-paper are to be taken into account. 
5. Conclusion 
The analytical and political consequences for the study of government put on the agenda 
by Lipsky’s book are still being dealt with (Brodkin 2012). Inasmuch as the policy pro-
cess, and particularly its implementation part ‘at the street level’, empirically represents a 
continuation of the political process, the normative consequences of observations like the 
ones above are substantial. Given the scope of this article these have been left aside. The 
focus has not been on ‘what should happen’ but on ‘what happens’.  
Obviously the texts of laws and public policies do not automatically predict the literal, 
direct and comprehensive pursuit of the expressed intentions in the practice of their im-
plementation. Hence it is this that needs research attention to begin with. Since the 1970s 
such attention is given in implementation research, as a subfield of Political Science and 
Public Administration (cf. Hill/Hupe 2009). Taking the comparative nature of street-level 
bureaucracy and, subsequently, the issue of generalization seriously implies approaching 
discretion in a specified way, as a multi-faceted concept. Most of all discretion is to be 
analyzed in its context.  
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